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Abstract 
Wireless medical devices and related information systems are vulnerable to use and abuse by unauthorized 
users. Medical systems are designed for a range of end users in different professional skill groups and also 
people who carry the devices in and on their bodies. Open, accurate and efficient communication is the priority 
for medical systems and as a consequence strong protection costs are traded against the utility benefits for open 
systems. Flexible security provisions are required and strong forensic capabilities built into the systems to treat 
the risk. In this paper we elaborate the problem area and discuss potential solutions to ready a medical system 
for the trade-off of open and secure services. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The main focus of this research is the treatment of criminal risk with wireless medical devices and related 
systems in a medical healthcare environment. The deployment of wireless communications in the medical 
healthcare environment has rapidly increased for efficiencies and to meet enhanced clinical requirements (Nita et 
al., 2011; Paquette, 2011; Topol, 2011). Many medical devices such as telemetry, pulse oximetry monitors, 
electrocardiography (ECG) carts, neuro-stimulators, infusion pumps, insulin pumps, pacemakers, implantable 
cardioverter defibrillators (ICD) and drug pumps all have been moved to wireless communication technologies. 
The big advantage is the continuous monitoring of users’ health in the real-time by automated equipment (Arney 
et al., 2011; Sagahyroon et al., 2011; Ren et al., 2010; Censi et al., 2010; Petkovic, 2009; Meingast et al., 2006).  
However, the nature of wireless networking has inherited security and privacy problems. In addition the health 
care environment has requirements of open communication between professionals and between professionals 
and customers – who are often mobile between diverse geographic locations (for example a person who has a 
pacemaker inserted in their heart is free to travel globally but may require medical assistance in a remote 
location). Similarly within hospitals the 24 x 7 care requirement has a variety of arrangements between 
professional groups to maintain the continuity of service. Even with these challenges the deployment of wireless 
technologies in the medical healthcare industry has delivered benefits (Hanna et al., 2011; Devaraj & Ezra, 2011; 
Censi et al., 2010). The risk of such application is both of technical functionality and services misuse. The 
medical devices have generated security vulnerabilities leading to incidents for patients due to malfunction, 
misuse and the unauthorized hacking in wireless devices and communication protocols. For instance, Radcliffe 
(2011) has demonstrated hacking wirelessly into a commercially available insulin pump, which controls the 
insulin dosages for patients who have diabetics.  Likewise, Halperin et al (2008, p. 1) have performed a number 
of “software radio-based attacks” on implantable cardioverter defibrillators (ICDs). Such types of attack can 
compromise patient safety, patient privacy and practitioner legal liability. 
This paper is to give an introduction to the types and architectures of wireless technologies and systems that are 
used in medical environments. The systems are assessed for security problems that can have consequence for 
privacy breaches and material harm to system users. The discussion is limited to elaborating potential risks and 
potential risk treatments. The concern of making these open systems ready for investigation is approached from 
the perspective of adding to the systems and implementing resources that can store evidence on the system use. 
MISUSE OF WIRELESS MEDICAL SYSTEMS  
A misuse can be defined as a negative “behaviour that is not allowed in the proposed system” (Sindre & 
Opdahl, 2005; cited in Smith et al., 2010, p. 3). For instance, a misuse can be referred when a malicious hacker 
attacks on a wireless medical systems like an insulin pump system to compromise patient safety by stopping or 
changing the dosage of drug-administration. While all care is taken to protect a patient the Information 
Technology (IT) system has the potential to kill or harm a patient through misuse or deliberate abuse of the 
capability. The security risk of wireless medical devices and networks used in medical healthcare sector have 
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been established in the literature (Cagalaban & Kim, 2011; Gollakota et al., 2011; Arney et al., 2011; Hanna et 
al., 2011; Huang & Segal, 2011; Maisel & Kohno, 2010; Al Ameen et al., 2010; Denning et al., 2010; Saleem et 
al., 2010; Fu, 2009; Malasri & Wang, 2009; Denning et al., 2009; Zhang et al, 2003). There is a potential to alter 
dosages and to stop or interrupt the devices from normal operations and compromise the patient safety. 
However, the current literature stops at protection (IT security) and little is done regarding preserving evidence 
left after the wireless medical devices and IT system have been compromised. Hence, the forensic readiness in 
wireless medical devices is critical. Likewise, RFID enabled wireless medical systems applied for patients’ 
monitoring or tracking in the hospitals can be exploited by a malicious hacker using one of potential attacks on 
implantable identification devices (IIDs) such as the cloning attack (Malasri & Wang, 2009). The IIDs are 
commonly implantable RFID tags with no power and vulnerable to threats. Hence, the attacker can compromise 
the privacy of the patients when patient unique IDs are obtained by using external RFID scanner. Table 1 lists 
such potential misuses of the technologies. The deployment of wireless technologies in the healthcare setting can 
not only offer benefits to the healthcare professionals but also to patients, while the pervasiveness of wireless 
medical devices and applications may possibly lead to potential misuse cases (Pyrek, 2011). Hasen and Hasen 
(2010) described the potential adverse events that could occur by using various implantable medical devices. For 
instance, the use of pacemaker or implanted cardiac defibrillator or ventricular assist device could lead to heart 
failure, arrhythmia, tachycardia and bradycardia. The nature of wireless networks allows potential threats and 
attacks to materialize that would have better treatment of risk in other types of communication network (Ngobeni 
et al., 2010). 
 
Class Description Misuse Example 
Wireless 
detection and 
connection 
Misuse involves 
an intruder using 
the wireless 
medium as a tool 
to commit other 
criminal activities 
Unauthorized use 
of WLAN or use 
of the WLAN as 
a launch pad for 
other criminal 
activities 
Concealment 
of digital 
evidence 
Misuse involves 
hidden wireless 
devices or hidden 
wireless networks  
Fake access 
points 
WLAN as an 
attack vector 
Misuse involves 
attacks against the 
devices originated 
from the wireless 
network and then 
attacks against the 
WLAN medium 
itself 
Rogue access 
point, Man-in-
the-Middle 
attacks  
Table 1 Classifications of WLAN misuse (adapted from Ngobeni et al., 2010, p. 108) 
TYPES OF WIRELESS MEDICAL NETWORKS 
Figure 1 shows the different types of wireless network based on span that are used in medical environments. 
Even though different types of technologies are being used in medical or healthcare industry, the following eight 
descriptions provide a comprehensive introduction: the Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN), Wireless Body Area 
Networks (WBANN), Wireless Personal Areal Networks (WPAN), Wireless Local Area Networks (WAN), 
Wireless Wide Area Networks (WWAN), General packet radio service (GPRS), Universal Mobile 
Telecommunications System (UMTS), and Radio Frequency Identification (RFID).  
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Figure 1 Medical wireless networks (Latre` et al., 2011, p. 6) 
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) 
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are gaining popularity in the deployment of healthcare applications as a result 
of patients’ tracking and real-time monitoring. It is performed by using low-cost, low-power sensor nodes 
deployed either inside the phenomenon or very close to it (Al Ameen et al., 2010; Yick et al., 2008; Sohraby et 
al., 2007; Ng et al., 2006; Akyildiz et al., 2002, p. 102). Darwish and Hassanien (2011) state that a WSN 
typically consists of a large number of sensor nodes which are equipped with on-board processors, 
communication and storage capabilities to collect and process significant information from the environment or 
phenomenon being monitored. For instance, a sensor node can use its processing ability to perform “simple 
computations and transmit only the required and partially processed data” (Darwish & Hassanien, 2011, p. 
5566). However, sensor nodes in a WSN may have not only different sensing and storage capabilities (e.g., 
optical or magnetic), but also different communication technologies used (e.g., infrared or radio frequency) and 
data transfer rates (Dargie & Poellabauer, 2010). Similarly, Sohraby et al (2007, p. 1) says that “a distributed or 
localised sensor, an interconnecting network, a central point of information clustering and a set of computing 
resources at the central point or beyond” are four fundamental elements of a sensor network (SN). Furthermore, 
the commercial WSNs can also be classified into two categories such as Category 1 WSNs (C1WSNs) and 
Category 2 WSNs (C2WSNs) (Sohraby et al, 2007, p. 7).  
 
Table 2 Categories of wireless sensor networks (adapted and simplified from Sohraby et al, 2007, pp. 7-
11; Darwish & Hassanien, 2011, pp. 5567-5568) 
 C1WSNs C2WSNs Applications 
[examples] 
Topology Multi-point-to-point 
(Mesh-based) 
Point-to-point, 
(star-based) 
Military  
[monitoring forces, 
targeting, enemy 
tracking, biological 
attack detection, etc.,] 
 
Environmental  
[forest fire detection, 
flood detection, etc.,]  
 
Health 
[drug administration, 
monitoring of 
Radio 
connectivity 
between 
wireless 
networks 
Multi-hop Single-hop 
Routing over 
the wireless 
network 
Dynamic Static 
Example Military theatre 
systems 
Residential control 
systems 
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Supported 
Applications 
Highly distributed 
high-node-count 
applications like 
environmental 
monitoring and 
national security 
systems 
Confined short-range 
spaces such as a home, 
a factory, a building or 
human body 
patients (remote or 
inside a hospital), 
etc.,] 
 
Home / Residential 
[home automation, 
automated meter 
reading, etc.,] 
 
Commercial 
[inventory control, 
vehicle tracking and 
detection, traffic flow 
surveillance, etc.,] 
Type of data 
flow 
High-data-rate Low-data-rate 
Standard 
 
ZigBee/IEEE 802.15.4 ZigBee/IEEE 802.15.4 
Frequency 2.4 GHz;  
Industrial, scientific 
and medical (ISM) 
radio band 
2.4 GHz;  
Industrial, scientific 
and medical (ISM) 
radio band 
Data 
transmission 
rate 
Up to 250 kbps Up to 250 kbps 
Distance 30 – 200 ft 30 – 200 feet 
Wireless Body Area Networks (WBANs) 
The emergent use of WBANs in the healthcare industry, especially in the fields of patient monitoring systems, is 
growing not only due to the advancement in wireless communication technologies, but also due to the 
development in wearable and implementable devices or sensors (Khan et al., 2012; Jain, 2011; Latre` et al., 
2011; Liolios et al., 2010; Lim et al., 2010). WBANs are typically deployed within a range of 1 to 2 meters. By 
deploying WBANs, an extensive group of novel applications such as “ubiquitous health monitoring (UHM), 
computer-assisted rehabilitation an emergency medical response system (EMRS)” are enabled to improve the 
quality of life (Latre` et al., 2011; Li et al., 2010, p. 51). For instance, the real-time monitoring of patients who 
suffer from diseases such as diabetes, cardio vascular diseases (CVDs) and the like can be performed remotely 
and continuously whether or not the patients are in the hospital or at home (Khan et al., 2010; Latre` et al., 2011; 
Li et al., 2011; Li et al., 2010). In general, a WBAN is made up of a large number of intelligent devices that are 
tiny and normally implanted in or place on the body, and are capable of continuous monitoring of patient’s 
physiological activities (Yuce & Khan, 2012; Chen et al., 2011; Latre` et al., 2011; Li et al., 2010).  
Latre` et al (2011, p. 2) states that sensors and actuators (or actors) are two types of devices used in BANs in 
order “to measure certain parameters of human body either externally or internally” and “to take some specific 
actions according to the data received from the sensors or through interaction with the user”, respectively. For 
example, the measurement of the heart beat or temperature of the body can be done by a sensor device. 
Likewise, a handheld device such as personal digital assistant (PDA) or a laptop or a smart phone can be 
operated as a sink to perform interaction between the wireless sensor device and the patient or doctor (Latre` et 
al., 2010). A sink node can either be mobile or fixed and thought of as a gateway between a WBAN and external 
network (Muhammad et al., 2005). Hence, the patient related data collected from body-attached or implanted 
sensors can then be transferred from a sink to a centralised medical database (Li et al., 2010). 
Wireless Personal Area Networks (WPANs) 
According to Noorzaie (2006), short range networks like WPANs using IEEE 802.15.4 or Bluetooth can be 
potentially deployed in the medical or healthcare industry (Chevrollier & Golmie, 2005; Golmie et al., 2005).  
For instance, WPANs can be used by nurses or doctors at the hospitals in order to monitor patients in real-time 
instead of visiting patients’ room frequently. Hence, nurses and doctors can have more opportunity to look after 
patients by saving time. In fact, WPANs can also be used to interconnect multiple devices within the hospital as 
the data collected from the patients can be transferred from one wireless device to another without performing 
data transferred manually by nurses or doctors (Noorzaie, 2006). 
Wireless Local Area Networks (WLANs) 
The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) LAN/MAN Standards Committee (IEEE 802) 
designed the original WLAN 802.11 standard in 1997 for 1 Mbps to 2 Mbps wireless communication in the 
public frequency band of 5GHz and 2.4GHz (Hoglund, 2007; Karygiannis & Owens, 2002). As a result of 
flexibility, low cost, mobility and simplicity in operation, the deployments of WLANs have been rapidly 
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growing and widely utilised in enterprises, homes, universities, cafés, airports and hospitals over the last decade  
(Witters, 2011; Ngobeni et al., 2010; Heslop et al., 2010; Achi et al., 2009; Cypher et al., 2006; Banitsas et al, 
2002). Unlike a traditional wired LAN, a WLAN or wireless Ethernet provides two or more end-user devices can 
communicate each other without requiring physical cabling by using Radio Frequency or Infra-Red technologies 
(Achi et al., 2009; Karygiannis & Owens, 2002). A WLAN mainly consists of two types of wireless devices such 
as a wireless station (e.g., laptop or PDA) and a wireless access point (WAP), and it is usually implemented as 
an extension to wired LAN (Scarfone et al. 2008, Varshney, 2003; Karygiannis & Owens, 2002). However, the 
typical indoors-connectivity range of IEEE 802.11 devices is up to 50 to 100 meters even though the greater 
connectivity range can be achieved in outdoors (Scarfone et al., 2008). Similarly, Chen et al (2004, p.1) state that 
WLANs are considered to be “the next generation of clinical data network” due to the prospect of capturing 
patients’ clinical data that can be sent to a doctor or centralised patient database of the hospital by using different 
wireless devices like laptops, tablet computers,  smart phones, PDAs or pagers (Newbold, 2004). For instance, 
802.11 WLANs are being deployed to perform continuous monitoring of patients at home or in a hospital 
(Vassis et al., 2010; Lin et al., 2004; Varshney, 2003). In other word, the “pervasive health monitoring, 
intelligent emergency management system, pervasive healthcare data access and ubiquitous mobile 
telemedicine” can be carried out by deploying WLANs to fulfill the vision of “Pervasive Healthcare” (Malasri 
et al., 2009; Varshney, 2007, p. 113).  
Wireless Wide Area Networks (WWANs) / GPRS / UMTS 
Nowadays, the deployment of pervasive wireless technologies such as WWANs, GPRS and UMTS can be 
possible to monitor or transfer vital data of patients in the field of medical or healthcare industry. For instance, 
MobiHealth project was initiated in Europe in order to establish “a generic platform for home healthcare using 
BAN-based sensors and GPRS or UMTS” (for WWANs connectivity) wireless communication technology 
(Noorzaie, 2006, p. 8). Consequently, healthcare professionals have the benefits of monitoring outpatients 
remotely. On the other hand, outpatients who wear wireless body sensor devices can also take advantage of 
improve mobility and reduce the disruption to daily life. 
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) 
RFID (radio frequency identification) technology can provide not only to identify the objects or people, but also 
provide healthcare professionals to have precise aces to the patient physiological data by using wireless radio 
communication (Liu et al., 2011; Yao et al., 2011; Hunt et al., 2007). As every system has its own essential 
components in order to operate successfully, a typical RFID system consists of three main components such as 
an RFID tag (active or passive) device, which is sometimes referred to as a transponder, RFID reader (or 
transceiver) and a host or controller which is connecting to an enterprise system (Roberts, 2006; Xiao et al., 
2007; Hunt et al., 2007). RFID tag devices can be used to also track the patients and medical equipment in a 
hospital (Parlak et al., 2012; Noorzaie, 2006). The successful deployment of RFID systems in hospitals or 
healthcare industry (see Figure 2.3) was stated in the “Evaluation the business value of RFID: Evidence from five 
case studies” (Tzeng et al., 2008, p. 601). For instance, a RFID system was used for an emergency room by 
tagging patients with passive tags that stored patients’ identification numbers (IDs) to track patients and monitor 
patients’ physiological signals. Likewise, “RFID smart medical platform” was used in one of the hospital in 
Taiwan to identify new born babies with active RFID tags (Tzeng et al., 2008, p. 607). Hence, the nurses or 
doctors can access medical information related to patients by using wireless devices like PDAs or smartphones 
after the RFID reader has validated patients’ IDs. 
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Table 3 Wireless technologies used for RTLS in hospitals (simplified from Fisher & Monahan, 2012, p. 708) 
DISCUSSION 
Figure 2 shows a summative architecture for the monitoring of a human body in a hospital setting. The wireless 
connection of a human’s most personal information is made into the medical information system that may extend 
beyond the immediate geographic location and access data storage facilities anywhere in a cloud network 
deployment. Similarly the hospital information system provides a push capability where the human vital 
statistics are controlled by feedback loops through the IT sensory systems. In both instances of push and pull, 
information risks to privacy and risks to life are exposed by the nature of the technology itself. In an ideal 
situation the technology delivers without fault, the users perform without error and no malicious activities occur. 
However in a forensically ready system the system and its potential effects have to be deconstructed and mapped 
against the risk criteria the industry has adopted. Immediately the risk of wireless communication systems 
security failure has to be factored into the preparation of a risk management plan.  In Figure 3 the elements of 
disclosure and control risk are materialized by placing a hacker into the information systems architecture in a 
position where influence can be exerted onto privacy security and control security. As has been discussed above 
the requirement to have open communications with many system user groups works against strong security and 
hence breaches can be expected. 
Figure 3 shows the architecture for system forensic readiness. A forensically ready system has security for 
prevention of events and forensic capability to investigate post events. The system architecture is enhanced by 
adding a forensic server to the hospital information system and also the deployment of drones within the wireless 
network. Drones are not visible to the wireless network users but they can track, trap and forward packets to the 
forensic server. RFID tagged elements within the medical system are also at risk of compromise from a range of 
attacks. Such events can be monitored by readers (fixed & mobile) and audited by mapping onto expected 
behaviours in the forensic server. In such a proposal the cost of information storage is balanced against the 
benefit of having the evidence and its ready availability. The utility cost to the service system is minimal as the 
forensic element is independent and self resourcing, and can function without visibility.       
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Figure 2 Continuous monitoring of patient’s physiological activities by using BAN and WLAN (adapted from 
Chen et al., 2010, p.1) 
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Figure 3 Proposed forensically ready hospital wireless network architecture 
CONCLUSION 
The adoption of wireless technologies in medical environments for medical device interaction and related 
information systems communications has increased the scope of possible problems that may arise from security 
breaches. The medical environment has requirements that cannot be satisfied by security provisions alone. Other 
researchers have shown that wireless security systems can be hacked and that the consequences for humans are 
fatal. The necessity of forensic readiness is a prudent risk treatment for such information systems. In this paper 
the medical uses of wireless communications has been reviewed in detail and a proposal for a forensically ready 
system made.     
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